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INFORMATION PROCESSING CONSTRAINTS AND ASSET
MISPRICING*
Alasdair Brown
I analyse a series of natural quasi-experiments – centred on betting exchange data on the Wimbledon
Tennis Championships – to determine whether information processing constraints are partially
responsible for mispricing in asset markets. I find that the arrival of information during each match
leads to substantial mispricing between two equivalent assets, and that part of this mispricing can be
attributed to differences in the frequency with which the two prices are updated inplay. This suggests
that information processing constraints force the periodic neglect of one of the assets, thereby
causing substantial, albeit temporary, mispricing in this simple asset market.
Traders are bombarded with information on the macroeconomy, industrial sectors and
on individual firms. This information comes in a variety of forms: newspaper articles,
blogs, tweets, meetings, broker phone calls and colleague’s emails. Even if traders are
attentive and receive all of this raw information, it is inevitable that they will be unable
to process it effectively, to deduce the implications for all of the assets (including
potential assets) in their portfolio. In this article, I investigate whether these
information processing constraints have an effect on the level of mispricing in asset
markets.
I use a series of natural quasi-experiments centred on Betfair betting exchange data
from the Men’s Wimbledon Singles Tennis Championships of 2011 and 2012. Trading
is conveniently divided between pre-match periods (when little or no information
arrives) and so-called ‘inplay’ periods during the match (when information is arriving
constantly). I hypothesise that the arrival of information means that traders’
information processing constraints suddenly become binding. While before the
match, bettors had time to assess and price the likelihood of, for example, a Roger
Federer win and a 3-1 Roger Federer win, during the match they are unable to process
the implications of new information for both these bets. Faced with this constraint,
bettors may choose to update the value of the bet on Roger Federer to win rather than
the bet on the specific score by which Federer will win. In other words, despite having
all the necessary raw information to price both bets, information processing constraints
may mean that the value of certain assets are not updated in a timely fashion, and
therefore mispricing is temporarily observed.
To verify this idea, I examine the evolution of the implied win probability of each
player in two markets: the win market, where the bet is explicitly priced; the set market,
where the bet on the player to win is implicitly priced via a replicating portfolio. The
‘replicating portfolio’ compiled in the set market will yield exactly the same payoffs as
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the win bet, regardless of the state of nature (outcome of the match). I find three
pieces of evidence consistent with the notion that information processing constraints
are a cause of asset mispricing. Firstly, the mispricing (calculated as the absolute
difference between the implied win probability in the win and set markets) is
substantially higher inplay than pre-match. This is where I believe that the constraint is
more likely to be binding. Secondly, I use a difference-in-difference approach to assess
the relative frequency of price changes in the two markets during each match. I find
that the price in the set market changes much less frequently during play (even after
controlling for intransient differences between the two markets and common effects of
information arrival). This suggests that a proportion of the mispricing can be
attributed to the price not being as regularly updated in the set market during each
match. Finally, I verify that the frequent changes in price in the win market are not
simply noise, by calculating the price discovery contribution of each market using a
variant of the Hasbrouck (1995) methodology. Consistent with the win market
becoming the preferred choice of traders when the information processing constraint
becomes binding, I find that the win market contributes at least 82% of price discovery
during each match.
I present further tests, the results of which are all consistent with information
processing constraints as a factor in mispricing. First, I separate matches into those
that are played in isolation (the semi-finals and finals of the two tournaments), and
those that are, at least in part, played simultaneously with another match (those at
the quarter-final stages). The idea is that any processing lag between the win and set
markets – within a match – will be exacerbated by the presence of a distracting
match. To put this another way, constraints on our ability to process information are
more likely to bind when we are forced to process more than one signal. In line with
this hypothesis, I find that mispricing is significantly higher inplay when another
match is taking place at the same time. Second, I create measures to assess the
uncertainty of the outcome of each match, and the importance of the most recent
passage of play. I then examine how these two measures correlate with mispricing.
The idea is that information of greater importance will require greater processing; if
such processing is constrained during matches, we are likely to observe higher levels
of mispricing at these times. Consistent with this idea, I find that mispricing is
significantly higher when a match is finely poised, and immediately after important
phases of play.
The implications of limited attention and limited processing power in asset markets
have been modelled by, among others, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Peng and Xiong
(2006), Huang and Liu (2007) and Mondria (2010).1 By identifying circumstances
where traders have all the necessary information but limited processing power, my
results build on the empirical work of Cohen and Lou (2012). Cohen and Lou
hypothesised that conglomerate firms – with operations in a number of industrial
segments – were ‘complicated’ in comparison to single industry firms. This is because
the proportion of income generated by each industrial segment evolves over time and
1 There is a large recent empirical literature linking investor (in)attention to asset prices (Barber and
Odean, 2008; Corwin and Coughenour, 2008; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2009, 2011;
Louis and Sun, 2010; Da et al., 2011; Chakrabarty and Moulton, 2012).
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a forecast of this proportion requires analysis. The implication of this proposition is
that industry-specific information would be more rapidly impounded into the price of
single industry firms, and the returns of a portfolio of these firms would therefore
predict the subsequent returns of conglomerate firms. This was indeed the result that
they found. In other words, while investors had all the necessary raw information to
price both simple and complicated firms accurately, constraints on their ability to
process this information led to temporary mispricings (in their case, over the course of
months).
The idea that assets which require more complicated information processing may be
mispriced for longer strikes a chord with my results. A bet on a player to win by a
certain score is a more precise, and perhaps more complicated, prediction than simply
wagering on the same player to win the match. Snowberg and Wolfers (2010)
presented betting market evidence that individuals struggle to correctly predict the
likelihood of small probability events. In addition, in terms of interpreting new
information received during each match, simple rules of thumb may not suffice in the
set betting market. If a player wins an individual point, it is reasonable to suggest that
the probability that they win the match either stays roughly the same or goes up.
Winning this same point, however, may increase the likelihood of winning by a certain
set score but decrease the likelihood of the other two possible set scores. Without a
simple rule of thumb, deciphering the impact of each point for each of the set bets
may be more difficult than conducting a similar exercise in the win market.
The trading mechanism on the betting exchange studied in this article resembles a
standard limit order book on a financial exchange. Traders can post liquidity (via limit
orders) or consume liquidity (via market orders). The payoffs in these assets resemble
those of short-maturity zero-recovery fixed-income assets. Bettors receive a fixed
amount if they are correct in their predictions, and lose their stake if they are incorrect,
much as you would by investing in a bond. This is also a competitive and dynamic
market, meaning that, much as in financial markets, there are significant costs to
repeatedly mispricing assets. Bettors who make errors in their estimation of a player’s
win probability can expect to be picked off by other bettors. These three points give my
analysis external validity.
There are also, it should be pointed out, advantages in using the exchange for this
type of study. First, there is a clear(er) separation between zero-information periods
and information periods than could be expected in any financial market. This allows
me to classify the arrival of information as a treatment in this natural quasi-experiment,
a treatment which pushes information processing ability towards its limit. There are
spikes of information arrival in financial markets (such as during earnings announce-
ments) but the distinction between information and zero-information periods is less
stark than in sports betting. Secondly, the speed with which events unfold in these
matches (over the course of hours) allows me to take a microscopic look at price
changes in the presence of information. This is in contrast to the longer-horizon asset-
pricing study of Cohen and Lou (2012). A third advantage is that I have a measure of
mispricing that can be identified by traders in real-time and, if the mispricing breaches
a certain level, can be immediately arbitraged (I discuss arbitrage on the betting
exchange in more detail in Section 4). This contrasts with many ex post inefficiencies
identified in financial markets – such as the ‘post-earnings announcement drift’
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(DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2009) – which are only apparent to
traders once the mispricing has been and gone.
The final advantage of using betting exchange data relates specifically to my attempt
to establish the role that information processing constraints play in asset mispricing. If
traders update the value of one of the assets that they are trading (e.g. the win bets) –
after viewing the progress of the match – this implies that they have received the
necessary information to update the value of the other assets that they are trading (e.g.
the set bets). Therefore, if mispricing between the two assets (during the match) is due
to cognitive limitations, it should be a result of constraints on our ability to process
information, rather than constraints on our ability to receive information. Whereas
there is some ambiguity in earlier limited attention studies as to whether traders failed
to process the new information quickly, or simply did not receive the information
(DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2009; Louis and Sun, 2010), there
should be no such ambiguity in this environment.
The attraction of high-frequency betting data has also encouraged the recent work
of Croxson and Reade (2011) and Choi and Hui (2012), who both examine Betfair
pricing during association football (soccer) matches. Croxson and Reade demonstrate
that betting exchange prices incorporate the effect of goals in a timely manner. Choi
and Hui, in a similar study, categorise the first goal of each match as either surprising
(if scored by the underdog team) or expected (if scored by the favourite team). This
approach allows for an examination of the way that prior beliefs shape reactions to
information. They find that the betting exchange overreacts to highly surprising events
but underreacts to less surprising events. My study is also closely related to the work of
Brown (2013). Brown uses Betfair Wimbledon tennis betting data (2008–12) to
compare the duration of arbitrage opportunities pre-inplay and inplay (algorithmic
arbitrageurs are more likely to be active inplay). Whereas Brown focuses on the factors
which determine the persistence of mispricing, my focus here is on the factors which
precipitate mispricing in asset markets.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. In Section 1, I speculate on the
cognitive limitations that may lead to asset mispricing. In Section 2, I describe the
betting exchange and present summary statistics. In Section 3, I conduct the empirical
analysis and in Section 4, I discuss alternative explanations for the pattern of results.
Section 5 concludes.
1. Psychological Foundations
In this Section, I speculate on the cognitive limitations that may lead to mispricing on
the betting exchange. Traders, wagering on the outcome of a tennis match, receive
stimuli (in the form of the outcome of each point) throughout the match. After each
point is played, I expect that they turn to analysing the implications of this point for
the bets that they are trading: the win bets and the set bets. The analysis that they
undertake can be thought of as two separate tasks, which in the absence of cognitive
limitations would be carried out simultaneously. If they are not carried out
simultaneously, we are likely to see mispricing between the two assets.
Psychologists, in a vast literature on ‘dual-task interference’, have noted that we are
often poor at completing two tasks simultaneously, see Paschler (1994) for a
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discussion. This applies even if the tasks are very simple. The original method of testing
for dual-task interference was to present subjects with two stimuli. Once each stimulus
was received, the subject would need to press a particular button, for example, to
indicate the type of signal that had been sent. To ascertain the degree of interference
between the two tasks, the experimenter would then vary the time between the two
stimuli. Performance in the two tasks –measured in terms of the speed and accuracy of
the subject’s reaction – was found to decline as the interval between the two stimuli was
reduced. (In my environment, there is only one stimulus – so the interval is effectively
zero – but there are still two simultaneous tasks to complete.)
The delay in the time it takes the subject to carry out the second task, as they are
arguably busy with the first task, is often referred to as the ‘psychological refractory
period’ (PRP). One prominent explanation for the PRP is that we share processing
capacity across tasks, so undertaking more than one task leads to declines in
performance in terms of speed and accuracy (Kahneman, 1973). Another explanation
is that we use a single processor to carry out many tasks and, therefore, if we are
required to complete multiple tasks, a bottleneck forms, as tasks are placed in a queue
to be completed by this single processor (Paschler, 1994). Pertinently, there is even
evidence to suggest that increased similarity between the two tasks actually hinders
performance (Navon and Miller, 1987). (This may be important on the betting
exchange as the two tasks are very similar in character.)
Dual-task interference is the most obvious cognitive limitation in my setting but may
just be one of many that has a role in asset mispricing. I am pre-supposing, for
example, that traders comprehend all the necessary information on the progress of the
match, and the pricing of the bets. However, psychologists have noted that there is
often a substantial difference between visualisation and perception. In other words,
even if an object crosses our eyeline, the information contained in this object is not
necessarily comprehended. Simons and Chabris (1999), in their much-heralded gorilla
experiment, found that many subjects – tasked with counting the number of basketball
passes in a video – failed to spot an individual in a gorilla suit walking into the shot.
This ‘inattentional blindness’ could have an impact on the betting exchange, where
traders may fail to spot a substantial discrepancy of pricing in the win and set markets –
even if the limit order book is in their view – if their focus is trained on the passage of
play on court.2
2. The Betting Exchange
The data in my study are taken from Betfair, a betting exchange in the UK. Betfair
provides a limit order book for bets on the full spectrum of sporting events, with a
particular emphasis on horse-racing, football and, to a slightly lesser extent, tennis.
2 Incidentally, inattentional blindness has also been identified outside of the laboratory. Chabris et al.
(2011) staged a series of mock-fights on a college campus and asked subjects whether they had noticed
anything unusual. The likelihood that subjects noticed the fights was partially determined by their attentional
load at the time (i.e. whether they were set a simultaneous task which could distract them). This experiment
was motivated by the case of Kenny Conley, a Boston police officer, who was convicted of perjury when he
testified under oath that during the chasing of a suspect he had not witnessed the beating of another officer,
despite having run straight past the attack.
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The exchange operates by matching up bettors who wish to ‘back’ (bet on) an
outcome, with those willing to ‘lay’ (bet against) the same outcome. Those taking the
lay position are assuming the role traditionally taken by bookmakers. The exchange
operates in a similar fashion to the standard financial exchanges. Specifically, bettors
can either submit a market order, which matches up with an offsetting limit order in
the book, or submit a limit order, which sits in the book until an offsetting market
order arrives. The exchange generates revenue by charging a commission (between 2%
and 5%) on the winner’s profits.
I collected data on 14 matches from the quarter-final stages to the final of the
Wimbledon Men’s Singles Championships in 2011 and 2012 (there are seven matches
in my sample from each tournament). Although this may seem a limited number of
matches, high-frequency sampling means that there are just shy of 800,000 observa-
tions for some of my later regressions. Wimbledon was chosen as it is the most
prestigious of the four grand-slam events in tennis, and the latter stages of the
tournament were chosen as these proved the most popular matches for betting. The
data were purchased from Fracsoft. For each match I randomly chose one player (to
ensure independent observations) and the chosen player is disclosed later in Tables 3,
6 and 7. The data I have are time-stamped and include quoted ‘back’ and ‘lay’ prices
(odds) sampled each second, for both pre-inplay periods before each match and inplay
periods during each match. The data also include the last transaction price (odds) and
the cumulative volume at each second of trading.
The betting on each match takes place in two markets. The first is the win market
where bets are traded on the winner. The second is the set market, which allows for
betting on the specific score by which each player wins. As matches in the grand-slam
events are conducted on a best-of-five sets basis, the set market comprises six possible
outcomes (3-0, 3-1, 3-2 to each player). I chose tennis predominantly because it has an
extensive inplay period but also because it is possible to replicate the bet on a player to
win with only three bets in the set market.
In all cases, I infer the implied probability of an outcome by taking the midpoint of
the spread. For example, if the back odds on a player to win are OB and the lay odds are
OL, then the implied win probability is ½1=ðOB þ 1Þ þ 1=ðOL þ 1Þ%=2. To calculate the
corresponding implied win probability from the set market, I simply sum the implied
probabilities for each of the three possible set scores by which he could win. For
example, take the odds on Andy Murray to win the Final (against Roger Federer) in
2012. At the start of the match (14:10:18), the back (lay) odds on a Murray win were 2
to 1 (2.05 to 1). In other words, those who backed at this price would have received £2
(plus their stake) for each £1 they put down, in the case of a win. A bettor laying this
outcome would be liable for £2.05 multiplied by the backer’s stake, in the case of a
Murray win, and would pocket the backer’s stake otherwise. The back (lay) odds were
8.8 (9) on a 3-0 Murray win, 7.6 (7.8) on a 3-1 win and 7 (7.2) on a 3-2 win. The implied
win probability is therefore 0.3306 in the win market and 0.3394 in the set market,
reflecting a very small mispricing of Murray’s prospects at the start of the match.
In the top two panels of Table 1, I describe the summary statistics on implied win
probability for the full 14 matches. The average implied win probability in the win
market (0.690867) is close to the average in the set market (0.682561). The
relationship appears to be closer pre-inplay, with respective averages of 0.6928574
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and 0.6933364 (the averages above 0.5 reflect the fact that the favourite was randomly
selected in the majority of the 14 matches). In Figure 1, I plot the implied win
probability – of Andy Murray in the 2012 Final – as inferred from the win and set
markets. Once again, the implied win probabilities track each other closely. One point
to make at this stage is that there are a small number of surprising readings of implied
win probability in the set market (incidentally, from matches other than the 2012
Final). For example, the maximum reading in the set market is 1.507688. Unlike in the
win market, the implied win probability in the set market is not bounded between 0
and 1. While these extreme readings are rare, I do exclude them later in my study to
ensure the robustness of my results.
Before I proceed, it is also worth explaining my choice of quoted prices, rather than
transaction prices, to calculate mispricings. I use the midpoint of the quoted spread on
the exchange for three reasons. Using transaction prices is problematic because the
volume in the set market is often lower than that in the win market. As a result, I could
be taking a substantially lagged valuation from the set market and wrongly inferring
that there are large mispricings between the two markets. Using quoted prices, I am
(as much as possible) comparing contemporaneous valuations. The second reason for
not using transaction prices is the presence of ‘bid-ask bounce’. Specifically, there
could be a situation where the quoted prices did not change but because a back order
was swiftly followed by a lay order – and these prices are separated by the spread – I
could wrongly infer from transaction prices that valuations have changed substantially.
By taking the midpoint of the spread, the results are not affected by the bounce caused
by opposing order flow.
One other reason to use quoted prices is the famous ‘favourite-longshot bias’. This is
where, on average, returns from bets on favourites exceed those of bets on longshots.
This bias was found as far back as Griffith (1949), and has also been observed, albeit to
a lesser degree, on Betfair by Smith et al. (2006). The foremost explanation for the bias
Table 1
Summary Statistics (Implied Win Probability)
Observations Mean SD Min. Max.
Win market
Pre-inplay 254,201 0.6928574 0.1988313 0.2919863 0.9569597
Inplay 138,786 0.6872213 0.2807402 0.0055 0.9852456
All 392,987 0.690867 0.2311134 0.0055 0.9852456
Set market
Pre-inplay 254,209 0.6933364 0.1989548 0 0.963456
Inplay 142,899 0.6633922 0.3072107 0 1.507688
All 397,108 0.682561 0.2439415 0 1.507688
Mispricing
Pre-inplay 254,201 0.0061245 0.0049588 2.32e&06 0.3306011
Inplay 138,786 0.0530399 0.1100309 0 0.8658171
All 392,987 0.022693 0.0692408 0 0.8658171
Notes. Summary statistics on implied win probability in the win market, implied win probability in the set
market and the mispricing (absolute difference) between the two. Data are sampled both before and during
each match. The data set comprises the 14 matches from the quarter-final stages onwards of the 2011 and
2012 Men’s Wimbledon Tennis Championships.
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in markets where bettors have a counterparty (including bookmaker markets and
betting exchanges but excluding pari-mutuel markets) is adverse selection (Shin, 1991,
1992, 1993). Put simply, the cost to a market-maker of losing out to an insider (with
advance knowledge of the outcome of the race) is greater when the winner is a
longshot (as they must pay out more). The response of the market-maker is to depress
the odds on the longshot further below their empirical probability than they would do
for the favourite’s odds. This would be a concern in my setting if I used transaction
prices – which are likely to be biased towards ‘backer-initiated’ bets – as the set market
implied win probability would regularly exceed the corresponding measure in the win
market. However, using the midpoint of the quoted spread is likely to mitigate this
problem, as this measure should approximate the liquidity provider’s prior unbiased
estimate of the probability of an outcome. Likewise, if the bias is generated by
risk-loving bettors, as in Ali (1979), or over (under) estimation of small (large)
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Fig. 1. The Implied Win Probability of Andy Murray in the 2012 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Championship
Final – As Inferred from the Win Market (a) and the Set Market (b) – Plotted Against Time
Notes. The match began at 14:10:18 (T = 17,723 on these plots).
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probabilities, as in Snowberg and Wolfers (2010), taking the midpoint of the spread
should largely offset these effects. The fact that the average implied win probability is
in fact (marginally) higher in the win market than the set market (see ‘All’ data in
Table 1) confirms this impression.
3. Data Analysis
3.1. Mispricing
My first task is to establish whether the arrival of public information – in this case, the
screening of a series of tennis matches – increases the level of mispricing between the
win and set markets. To do this, I measure mispricing as the absolute difference
between the implied win probability in the win market and the corresponding implied
win probability in the set market. The bottom panel of Table 1 describes summary
statistics on this measure. I find that the average mispricing between these two markets
is quite small (0.02), partly because there are cases where the measure is nil. This is
reassuring because, despite the differences in the way implied win probability is
calculated (from 1 or 3 set(s) of prices), this demonstrates that the two markets can, at
times, come to a consensus on the probability of a player’s win.
Staying with the bottom panel of Table 1, we see the first evidence that mispricing is
indeed higher when public information is arriving. There is a more than 10-fold
increase in average mispricing during inplay periods compared to the same matches
pre-inplay. Figure 2 captures this fact vividly. I plot mispricing regarding Andy Murray’s
implied win probability in the Final of 2012, for both pre-inplay and inplay (beginning
at T = 17,723). Mispricing is visibly higher during the match.
In Table 2, I test this proposition more formally. In all of the regressions in this table,
I include random effects for the 14 matches in my study, to ensure that any observed
effect is widespread. In the first regression, I regress mispricing on an indicator variable
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Fig. 2. The Mispricing of Bets on Andy Murray to Win the 2012 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Championship
Final, Plotted Against Time
Notes. Mispricing is measured as the absolute difference between the implied win probabilities in
the win and set markets. The match began at 14:10:18 (T = 17,723 on this plot).
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equalling 1 if the time period is during a match and 0 otherwise. I find that mispricing
is higher during matches, with significance at the 0.1% level. This is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the notion that binding processing constraints are a driver of
asset mispricing. The first thing to note, however, is that any measure constructed from
quoted prices will undoubtedly be persistent. Therefore in regression 2, I exclude all
observations where neither the implied win probability in the win market nor the
implied win probability in the set market changed in the last second. This should
reduce the extent to which serial correlation in mispricing is driving my result. Even
after excluding these observations, I find that mispricing is significantly higher (at the
0.1% level) during matches.3 I also wish to ensure that mispricing is not caused by the
order book recovering from trade in the last period. If it were, mispricing would be a
reflection of temporary illiquidity rather than differences in valuation. To deal with
this issue, in regression 3, I exclude all observations where there was an order (in either
the win or set market) in the preceding second. I find the aforementioned result is
robust to this choice of subsample, and, in fact, the difference between the coefficients
in regressions 1 and 3 suggests that trade during the match reduces rather than
increases mispricing (the inplay effect is higher in regression 3). Finally, I mentioned
earlier that there were a few readings of implied win probability in the set market that
exceeded 1. In the fourth regression of Table 2, I exclude these readings, thereby
omitting 7,520 of the 392,944 observations. Once again, I find that mispricing is higher
in inplay periods, with significance at the 0.1% level.
Table 2
Mispricing
Dependent variable:
Mispricing (t)
1
All
2
D IWP(|) 6¼ 0
3
Orders(t&1) = 0
4
IWP(Set) < 1
5
All
Intercept 0.0043192 0.0167905 0.0044452 0.0043159 0.0043245
(0.0062537) (0.0215517) (0.0036837) (0.0063836) (0.0062911)
Inplay indicator (t) 0.0495418*** 0.0429167*** 0.0561157*** 0.0465738*** 0.0522584***
(0.0002059) (0.0014612) (0.0002596) (0.0002073) (0.0002124)
One set outcome
Indicator (t)
&0.0294461***
(0.0005892)
q 0.12901166 0.51238849 0.07111057 0.1368458 0.13107971
No. of
observations
392,987 41,572 266,313 385,463 392,987
R2 0.1049 0.0127 0.1424 0.0945 0.1137
Notes. A series of regressions to compare mispricing (the absolute difference between implied win
probabilities in the win & set markets) in pre-inplay and inplay periods. An indicator variable for inplay is the
main explanatory variable. Regression 2 is limited to observations where the implied win probability changed
(in either market) in the previous second, Regression 3 excludes observations where an order arrived (in
either market) in the previous second and Regression 4 includes only observations where the implied win
probability in the set market is less than 1, to exclude spurious readings of mispricing. In Regression 5, an
indicator variable – equalling 1 if there is only one set outcome possible (i.e. 3-2) – is added to the
specification. All 5 regressions include random effects for each match, and q captures the proportion of
variance in the dependent variable captured by these random effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, and
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively.
3 The result is also robust to including lagged mispricing as an additional explanatory variable, or using
Newey–West standard errors, to control for persistence in the mispricing measure. The results of these two
regressions are not tabulated.
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The effect of information on mispricing – a more than 10-fold increase during
matches judging by the coefficients in the first regression of Table 2 – is particularly
striking when we consider that there are likely to be two factors acting as a restraint on
mispricing. First of all, if mispricing increases beyond a certain level, arbitrage
opportunities arise. An arbitrageur can construct a simple strategy of betting on a
player to win in the win market, and betting against the same player in the set market
(or vice versa). Mispricing may need to be greater than 5% for the arbitrage trade to be
profitable – as Betfair commission is charged separately in the win and set market (see
the discussion at the end of Section 4) – but the presence of arbitrageurs should
nevertheless act as a restraint on large mispricing between the two markets. The second
factor is that the progression of the match resolves uncertainty about the likely winner.
At the end of the match, all uncertainty is resolved and mispricing must converge to
zero. There is, after all, no more information to process.
One way of assessing the extent to which information processing constraints are
responsible for this mispricing is to calculate mispricing when there is only one
possible set score by which the player could win. If the player sampled either lost the
match, or won by 3 sets to 2, there will be periods in which processing the implications
of new information for the set bets is equivalent to processing the same information for
the win bets. Essentially, in this situation the player can only win 3-2, so set bet pricing
requires no additional effort to that already undertaken for the win bets. In regression
5 of Table 2, I add an indicator variable, equalling 1 if the player can only win by one
possible set score at that time, and 0 otherwise. This comprises 9.13% of inplay time for
the full 14 match sample. The level of mispricing is – judging by the size of the
coefficients – more than 50% lower during these periods. In other words, when no
additional information processing effort is required to price a set bet, the level of
mispricing between win and set bets is much lower.
Up until this point, I have included random effects for each match to ensure that my
results are not driven by particularly high inplay readings of mispricing in a few
matches. I would like, however, to ascertain the breadth of the effect that information
arrival has on asset mispricing. I do this by running the first regression of Table 2
individually for each of the 14 matches. Table 3 displays the coefficient associated with
the inplay indicator for each of these matches. (I estimated these regressions with
White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.) The inplay effect is positive and
significant in all of the 14 matches, with significance at the 0.1% level.
It is worth pausing at this stage to consider the result we would expect in this Section
if information processing constraints did not bind. If information processing
constraints were not binding, we would expect there to be no difference in the levels
of mispricing pre-inplay and inplay. As information arrives, we would expect the
implications of this information to be processed simultaneously for the two types of
bet. Therefore, while the value of both the win and set bets would have changed as a
result of information, there would be no effect on my measure of (relative) mispricing
between the two. It is arguably only because information processing constraints bind –
and therefore create a lag between the processing of information for win and set bets
(I will come to this in subsection 3.3) – that we may observe higher levels of mispricing
inplay.
© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
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Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between mispricing that arises as a result
of the arrival of information, and mispricing that arises due to constraints on our
ability to process this information. To this end, I am inspired by the work of Hirshleifer
et al. (2009). These authors found that information from earnings announcements was
less likely to be incorporated into asset prices when there were a number of
announcements competing for the same investors’ limited attention on the same day.
With this in mind, it is possible that the level of mispricing that we observe on the
betting exchange is affected by whether other matches are taking place on the same
day. If there are other matches taking place, they may act as distractions which
exacerbate the processing lag between the two types of bet. In 2011 and 2012, the
quarter-finals were staged on a Wednesday, with the semi-finals staged on a Friday and
the final on a Sunday. With four quarter-final matches taking place on the same day,
two are staged on Centre Court (the prime venue), with the other two on Court One.
This means that for much of the quarter-final stage, another prominent match acts as a
distraction. The semi-finals, on the other hand, are staged sequentially on the same
court and are therefore not subject to distracting events (at least not in the men’s
tournament), and neither is the final.
Following this intuition, in regression 2 of Table 4, I add an indicator variable for
whether the match was a semi-final or final (i.e. took place in isolation), and I also
interact this indicator with the inplay indicator variable (Regression 1 from Table 2 is
also recreated in Table 4 for comparison purposes and random effects for each match
are used, as before). I expect that if the match is played in isolation, the level of
mispricing should be lower (particularly inplay), as traders can concentrate on
Table 3
Mispricing (Each Match)
Match
Inplay
indicator (t)
coefficient
Standard
error N R2
Murray versus Federer 2012 final 0.0096083*** 0.000139 32,384 0.1461
Tsonga versus Murray 2012 semi-final 0.0111361*** 0.0001683 32,309 0.219
Djokovic versus Federer 2012 semi-final 0.0194546*** 0.0002875 20,335 0.241
Federer versus Youzhny 2012 quarter-final 0.0399362*** 0.0008172 19,681 0.2622
Djokovic versus Mayer 2012 quarter-final 0.0611478*** 0.0008678 21,107 0.3457
Murray versus Ferrer 2012 quarter-final 0.032999*** 0.0002968 37,880 0.3208
Tsonga versus Kohlschreiber 2012
quarter-final
0.3008394*** 0.0027017 33,102 0.4605
Djokovic versus Nadal 2011 final 0.0102964*** 0.0001992 19,455 0.1352
Nadal versus Murray 2011 semi-final 0.0188857*** 0.0002306 36,794 0.2768
Djokovic versus Tsonga 2011 semi-final 0.0281305*** 0.0004562 24,509 0.1573
Murray versus Lopez 2011 quarter-final 0.0255682*** 0.0005666 33,394 0.1771
Nadal versus Fish 2011 quarter-final 0.040167*** 0.000582 34,287 0.2547
Djokovic versus Tomic 2011 quarter-final 0.0503126*** 0.0004834 22,938 0.3924
Federer versus Tsonga 2011 quarter-final 0.026002*** 0.0003781 24,812 0.1846
Notes. A repeat of regression 1 of Table 2, this time run individually for each of the 14 matches in the data set.
The only coefficient displayed is that associated with the indicator variable for inplay periods. In each match,
bets on only one player (the first listed) were sampled. All regressions are estimated with White
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses), and *, ** and *** indicate significance at the
5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively.
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processing the progress of one match for the various types of bets available. Indeed,
this is the result I find, with mispricing significantly lower inplay in the latter stages of
the tournament compared to the quarter-finals.
One caveat at this stage is that there may be confounding differences between the
quarter-final stages and later rounds. Even though I have interacted the ‘semi-final
onwards indicator’ with the inplay indicator (so such a confound would have to
materialise only inplay), it must be acknowledged that Wimbledon is a seeded
tournament, so we can expect that the latter stages will be contested by more evenly
matched players. To capture this potential confound, I constructed a measure of
‘uncertainty’ in the outcome of the match, defined as 0.5 minus the absolute
difference between 0.5 and the implied win probability (in the win market). (Summary
statistics in Table 1, and the forthcoming analysis in subsection 3.3, attest to the greater
reliability/efficiency of the win market prices.) This uncertainty measure varies
between 0 (when one player is nigh-on certain to win) and 0.5 (when the match is
perfectly balanced). When I add this measure (and its interaction with the inplay
indicator) to my analysis in regression 3 of Table 4, I find that I may actually have been
underestimating the effect that distracting events (i.e. other simultaneous matches)
have on the level of mispricing. The level of mispricing is even further reduced for
Table 4
Mispricing (Further Analysis)
Dependent variable:
Mispricing (t)
1
All
2
All
3
All
4
All
Intercept 0.0043192 0.0041811 0.0472189*** 0.0469867***
(0.0062537) (0.0084557) (0.0083643) (0.0063021)
Inplay indicator (t) 0.0495418*** 0.0758816*** 0.0223086*** 0.0218303***
(0.0002059) (0.0002678) (0.0005582) (0.0005571)
SF onwards indicator 0.0019596 0.0459945*** 0.0457631***
(0.0129165) (0.0127642) (0.0096099)
SF onwards indicator 9
inplay indicator
&0.0598819*** &0.1048588*** &0.1046094***
(0.0004037) (0.0005888) (0.0005875)
Uncertainty &0.2497721*** &0.2484753***
(0.0029973) (0.0029906)
Uncertainty 9 inplay indicator 0.2959461*** 0.2896722***
(0.0026048) (0.0026034)
abs[D in IWP(win)] 0.7407831
(0.6000655)
abs[D in IWP(win)] 9
inplay indicator (t)
1.491956*
(0.6023922)
q 0.12901166 0.14046007 0.14175178 0.08582684
No. of observations 392,987 392,987 392,987 392,945
R2 0.1049 0.164 0.1379 0.1421
Notes. Further analysis related to mispricing, defined as the absolute difference between the implied win
probabilities in the win and set markets. Mispricing is regressed on an inplay indicator (as in Table 2), an
indicator equalling 1 if the match was a semi-final or final in either of the years (i.e. took place in isolation),
a measure of the uncertainty of the match (defined as 0.5-abs[IWP(win)-0.5]), and a measure of the
magnitude of information that has just arrived (defined as abs[D in IWP(win)]). Interactions of these
variables with the inplay indicator are added to establish the specific role of the these effects, on mispricing,
during the matches. All 4 regressions include random effects for each match, and q captures the proportion
of variance in the dependent variable captured by these random effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
and *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively.
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matches played in isolation – compared to regression 2 – when I control for the
uncertainty of the match. From regression 3, I can observe that the more uncertain the
match is (specifically while it is inplay), the greater the level of mispricing. This is
presumably because information (such as the outcome of each point/game), takes on
greater importance when the players are locked in a tight battle and, as the importance
of each point increases, so do the issues that arise in processing this information for
both win and set bets.
Along the same lines, we would expect that the level of mispricing observed inplay
should be affected by the importance of the most recent passage of play. Not all
passages of play are equally important. There are inevitable lulls in play, such as when
players sit down between games, during rain-breaks, and during sets where one player
has taken a large (almost) unassailable lead. We would expect mispricing to be lower
here – as there is little or no information to process – than it is during a tight tie-break,
for example. In regression 4, I add a measure of the importance of the most recent
piece of information, defined as the absolute change in the implied win probability in
the win market, in the last second. (As mentioned before, my overall analysis suggests
that the win market is the more efficient of the two, so provides a more reliable
measure of the importance of the information that has just arrived.) When this
measure is added, along with its interaction with the inplay indicator, I find that the
level of mispricing is indeed higher when important information has just arrived (with
significance at the 5% level) and that this effect is specifically found inplay (i.e. when
the vast majority of information arrives).4
To conclude at this stage, information does appear to induce mispricing on the
betting exchange. In addition, mispricing is found to be higher when there are
distracting events, and when the match is finely poised. It must be re-stated, however,
that higher levels of mispricing during matches are only a part of the jigsaw. In the next
Section, I examine each price change – in both markets – in an attempt to establish
further the role that information processing constraints play in the formation of
mispricing during matches.
3.2. Information Processing Constraints
To examine whether information processing constraints can explain mispricing, I set
up a difference-in-difference model. The aim is to assess the frequency of any changes
in valuations during each match. The idea behind the regressions that follow is that I
must, first, control for intransient differences between the win and set market (in terms
of volume, prominence, price mechanisms etc.), and, second, I must also control for
common effects that the arrival of information has on both markets. Once I have
controlled for these two factors, I can then isolate the different impact that
information has on the frequency of reaction in each market.
4 Using absolute changes in the win price (in the last second) is, of course, not the cleanest way to measure
the importance of the most recent information. The ideal technique would be to exogenously time-stamp
breaks in play (such as during rain, or between games). However, video footage (where available) would only
allow for time-stamping to the nearest minute (when observing the clock on the scoreboard), and internet
descriptions of the game (such as on the BBC website) are also only time-stamped to the nearest minute. This
precision compares unfavourably to the precision of the betting data which are observed every second.
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In the top panel of Table 5, I regress an indicator variable equalling 1 if the implied
win probability changed in the last second, and 0 otherwise, on three explanatory
variables. The first explanatory variable is an indicator for whether the market is the
win market (to control for intransient differences between the two markets),
the second variable is an indicator for whether the match is inplay (to control for
the common effect of information on the frequency of price revision) and the third
variable is an interaction between the two aforementioned indicators. The interaction
term is crucial as this captures any differences in the frequency of the two markets’
responses during information arrival. A logit specification is used and random effects
for each match are included. There are three results, all significant at the 0.1% level.
First, in the baseline pre-match (no information) period, it appears that the set
market is more susceptible to changes in valuations as the coefficient associated with
the win market indicator is negative. This is perhaps expected, as trade in the set
market allows for finer distinctions between different implied win probabilities as this
measure is constructed from three prices rather than just one. Second, both markets
respond more frequently when information arrives as the coefficient associated with
the inplay indicator is positive. This is certainly expected, as traders are more likely to
revise their valuations when new information arrives. Third, judging by the coefficient
associated with the interaction term, it is the win market that is more likely to respond
during matches. This evidence is consistent with the notion that the arrival of
information means that constraints on traders’ capacity to process information
suddenly become binding. Rather than interpret the implications of the last point for
the eight bets in the two markets (two in the win market and six in the set market),
Table 5
Information Processing Constraints
Dependent variable: Change in implied
win probability (Indicator) All If orders(t&1) = 0
Intercept &4.520144*** &5.579031***
(0.0675464) (0.0800766)
Win market indicator &1.572785*** &2.175892***
(0.0461928) (0.1063822)
Inplay indicator (t&1) 2.755914*** 3.364475***
(0.0207224) (0.0347103)
Win market indicator 9 inplay
indicator (t&1)
1.729583*** 2.294867***
(0.0473131) (0.1077369)
q 0.0175126 0.0220511
No. of observations where dependent variable = 1 45,145 15,914
No. of observations 794,214 650,456
Notes. Two regressions to assess whether the arrival of information inplay causes information processing
constraints to bind and therefore means that the price in one market is updated less frequently. The
dependent variable is an indicator variable equalling 1 if the implied probability changed in the last second.
The explanatory variables are an indicator for the win market, an indicator for inplay periods and an
interaction between these two indicators. The interaction term is crucial, as it captures the differences in the
frequency with which the two markets respond to information (the treatment). In the second regression,
I exclude all observations which immediately follow an order in the market concerned. Both regres-
sions incorporate random effects for each match, and q captures the proportion of variance in the
dependent variable that can be attributed to these random effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, and *,
** and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively.
© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
I N F O RMA T I O N P RO C E S S I N G CON S T R A I N T S 15
they are only able to process information related to the win bets. When there is a
pause inplay – for example, when players sit down at the change of ends – perhaps
they are then able to update their valuations of all the set betting outcomes. This
would explain why updating in the set market is much less frequent inplay.
Crucially, this difference-in-difference analysis allows me to separate out the effect of
information arrival from the effect of binding information processing constraints. The
indicator for the inplay period controls for the frequency of prices changes as
information arrives. The interaction term then captures the difference in the
frequency with which the two markets respond to such information. If constraints
were not binding, there should be no significance attached to this interaction term.
The fact that there is gives information processing constraints a key role in the
mispricing I documented in the previous subsection.
Returning to analysis, one concern at this point is that changes in valuations may
be a reflection of asymmetries in order flow. I mentioned earlier that volume in the
win market was typically higher than volume in the set market. In order to ensure
that changes in price are reflections of changes in traders’ valuations, rather than a
result of the transient impact of orders, I also repeated the first regression in Table 5
but this time excluded all observations where an order had taken place in the market
concerned in the previous second. As a result, I can focus solely on changes in
valuation that are not induced (directly, at least) by orders. These results are
presented in regression 2 of Table 5. The effect remains – the set market responds
less frequently than the win market – and indeed is stronger for this choice of
subsample.
Although I have used random effects to incorporate factors idiosyncratic to each
match, in Table 6 I repeat my two regressions individually for the 14 matches in the
sample. In each case, I display the coefficient associated with the interaction between
the win market and inplay indicators, in order to capture the relative frequency of
price changes during each match. The results that correspond to the first (second)
regression in Table 5 are displayed in the top (bottom) panel of Table 6. (All
regressions in Table 6 are estimated using White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors). My earlier results are replicated in all of the 14 matches for the first regression
and 12 of the 14 matches in the second regression. In each case where statistical
significance (at least at the 5% level) is found, the win market responds more often to
information inplay.
3.3. Price Discovery
At this stage, I have provided two sets of results that are consistent with the notion that
information processing constraints are partially responsible for mispricing in this
market. The first piece of evidence was that mispricing was higher inplay (when
constraints were more likely to be binding) and the second piece of evidence was that
this was partially driven by differences in the frequencies with which prices were
updated in the two markets examined. Essentially, I could argue that the set market
valuation differed from that of the win market inplay because information processing
capacity was focused on the latter market.
© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
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One gap in this argument, however, is that I cannot be sure at this stage that the
frequent price changes in the win market are not simply noise. If limited processing
capacity is truly being focused on the win market bets, then we should see that win
market price changes lead set market price changes. In other words, only when there is
a lull in play (or indeed only when arbitrageurs arrive on the scene) does the set
market catch up with the information processing that has already taken place for the
win bets.
To verify this idea, I use a variant of the price discovery models of Garbade and Silber
(1983) and Hasbrouck (1995). As my setting has only two prices, rather than n as in
Hasbrouck (1995), my model more closely resembles that of Garbade and Silber
(1983). I define Wt as the implied probability of a player winning in the win market,
and St as the implied probability of the same player winning in the set market. Both
implied win probabilities are defined in Section 2. I then estimate the following two
regressions:
Wt &Wt&1 ¼ b0 þ b1ðSt&1 &Wt&1Þ þ !t ð1Þ
St & St&1 ¼ a0 þ a1ðWt&1 & St&1Þ þ ut ð2Þ
where !t and ut are error terms. The idea behind these regressions is straightforward.
The greater the coefficient b1, the greater the contribution of the set market to price
discovery. A high b1 would suggest that a mispricing between the two markets at time
t & 1 is corrected by a subsequent price change in the win market Wt & Wt&1. This
would imply that the set market leads the win market in terms of price discovery, and is
the location of the initial information processing. On the flipside, however, the greater
the coefficient a1, the greater the price discovery contribution of the win market. A
mispricing at time t & 1 is corrected by a subsequent price change in the set market
St & St&1. I expect that a1 [ b1, as the win market is the more frequent updater of
price (see subsection 3.2).5
Using these estimated coefficients, I calculated the win market contribution to price
discovery, defined as ½a1=ðb1 þ a1Þ%. This measure, along with the coefficients for each
of the 14 matches, is displayed in Table 7. (All regressions in Table 7 are estimated
using White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.) Sampling for this data is
carried out at 1 minute intervals to allow sufficient time for information to arrive (this
leaves time for approximately one point to be played). In line with my hypothesis – that
information processing constraints bind inplay and that limited processing power is
focused on the win market – I find that the win market is the major (and sometimes
sole) contributor to price discovery. The lowest win market contribution (82%) is
found in the first semi-final of 2012. In some cases, the contribution of the set market is
actually negative, implying that on the occasions that the set market leads the win
market, it is more often wrong than right (i.e. win market prices subsequently go in the
other direction). This provides quite clear evidence that information processing
capacity is being focused on the win market. I checked the robustness of my results to
varying the sampling interval (10 seconds, 30 seconds, 2 minutes) and also used
5 For more details on price discovery models, as applied to betting exchange data, see Chapter 2 of Brown
(2012).
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Newey–West standard errors to account for serial correlation. The results are
qualitatively the same so I do not present them here.
4. Discussion
In this Section, I will discuss two alternative explanations for the pattern of results
described in this article. The first alternative explanation is the ‘gradual information
flow’ hypothesis (developed by Hong and Stein, 1999 with empirical evidence in Hong
et al., 2000). The idea behind this model is that information – particularly private
information – diffuses gradually across a population. This creates price momentum as
the implications of a piece of new information are reflected in asset prices only after a
significant lag. On the face of it, this does not seem an appropriate model for sports
betting information. Bettors all view the same match – on television or at the stadium –
and therefore can expect to be privy to the same information at the same time. This
may not, however, be true. Television pictures of sporting events, including tennis, are
broadcast with a lag. This means that those watching the tennis at the venue itself will
receive each public signal a few seconds before those watching the same match on
television. There are rumours that a number of Betfair customers, so-called
‘courtsiders’, have been exploiting this opportunity by placing bets with advance
knowledge of the outcome of the last point (Guardian 29 June 2011). If ‘courtsiders’
are concentrated in the win market, this could explain why the win market leads the set
market in price discovery.
The problem with this explanation for the results is that it is consistent with only
two of the three results presented in this article. It is consistent with greater
Table 7
Price Discovery Contribution
Match b1 a1
Win market
contribution N
Murray versus Federer 2012 final 0.0233286 0.3077421** 0.93 244
Tsonga versus Murray 2012 semi-final 0.1312763 0.6024121*** 0.82 139
Djokovic versus Federer 2012 semi-final &0.0156917 1.020275*** 1.02 167
Federer versus Youzhny 2012 quarter-final 0.0171214. 0.7204173** 0.98 83
Djokovic versus Mayer 2012 quarter-final 0.0075639 0.486052*** 0.98 107
Murray versus Ferrer 2012 quarter-final &0.0247664 0.510142*** 1.05 257
Tsonga versus Kohlschreiber 2012 quarter-final 0.0024792 0.1484792** 0.98 169
Djokovic versus Nadal 2011 final &0.2852521* 1.043141*** 1.38 149
Nadal versus Murray 2011 semi-final 0.0502479 1.090315*** 0.96 178
Djokovic versus Tsonga 2011 semi-final &0.0778784* 0.8453572** 1.10 185
Murray versus Lopez 2011 quarter-final 0.0271175** 0.5637822** 0.95 122
Nadal versus Fish 2011 quarter-final 0.0028727 0.743369** 1.00 164
Djokovic versus Tomic 2011 quarter-final 0.0058966 0.5551947*** 0.99 161
Federer versus Tsonga 2011 quarter-final &0.0900856* 0.7017461*** 1.15 189
Notes. A Table describing the win market contribution to price discovery – defined as a1=ðb1 þ a1Þ – for each
of the 14 matches in the data set. b1 and a1 are estimates from (1) and (2) respectively. Data are sampled at 1
minute intervals and, in each match, bets on only one player (the first listed) were sampled. Price discovery
contributions of greater than 1 indicate that on the occasions that the set market leads the win market, it is
more often wrong than right (i.e. win market prices subsequently go in the other direction). All equations
were estimated with White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, and *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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mispricing of bets inplay (in subsection 3.1), as information on the progress of the
match diffuses gradually across the two markets. It is also consistent with the win
market leading the set market in subsection 3.3 (if ‘courtsiders’ do indeed con-
centrate in the win market). It is not, however, consistent with the quasi-experimental
results in subsection 3.2. I find that the set market price is not simply updated later,
but it is also updated less frequently. This is consistent, to my mind, only with the
idea that information processing constraints force the periodic neglect of the set
market.
A second possible explanation is that different interpretations of public
information are driving my results. Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and
Pearson (1995) present models where traders with different likelihood functions
differ in their interpretation of public information. This explanation may be
consistent with the mispricing effect in subsection 3.1, as information arrival could
induce disagreement between the two markets (if they have slightly different trading
populations). It is not consistent, however, with the other two results. There is no
reason why different interpretations should lead to differences in the frequencies
with which traders respond to information (unless one set of traders is utterly
unresponsive to certain information). In addition, different interpretations cannot
create the price discovery relationship documented in subsection 3.3 unless traders
learn from the beliefs of others. This learning is not permitted in the models of
Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) as otherwise disagreement
would immediately disappear.
The results in this article do leave some open questions, however. Why, when
algorithmic trading is commonplace in asset markets, is human information processing
still required to eliminate mispricing? Why, after a human has interpreted the
implications of the last point for the win bets, does an automated trader not
instantaneously bring the set market in-line by a process of arbitrage?
First, in answer to these questions, there is some evidence that mispricings are in fact
eliminated in a reasonably short period of time. Returning to Figure 2, we can observe
from the number of short, sharp spikes that mispricings come and go quite rapidly. (Of
course, not so rapidly as to be unobservable to the econometrician.) It seems, however,
that just as one mispricing disappears, it is replaced by another, as new information
arrives frequently during the match.
A second point relates to the limits of arbitrage (Gromb and Vayanos, 2010) and the
limits of computerised trading. Betfair allows for algorithmic trading through their
Application Programming Interface. This allows automated traders to bypass the
conventional website and access the limit order book directly, thus hastening the
trading process. Nevertheless, it is not possible for algorithmic traders to eliminate all
of the mispricings that we observe, at least not in a risk-free manner. As mentioned
earlier, Betfair charges a commission (between 2% and 5%, dependent on the volume
of each trader’s prior betting activity). This commission is payable on the net winnings
in both the win and the set market.
To see why the Betfair commission may lead to persistent (and therefore easily
observable) mispricing, I display two panels in Figure 3. The top panel contains a
shortened version of Figure 2, displaying the mispricing of bets on Andy Murray in the
Final of 2012, up until the point at which he lost a set. The bottom panel of Figure 3
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displays the available returns to an arbitrage strategy over the same period (assuming a
commission level of 2%). The arbitrage returns data are taken from Brown (2013). The
strategy involves a short position in the win market and a long position on all of the
three possible set outcomes (incidentally, the opposite strategy is even less profitable
over this period). This strategy could be implemented algorithmically and is coded –
using the method of Brown (2013) – so as to yield an identical return irrespective of
the outcome of the match.
The natural conclusion from this graph is that arbitrage opportunities are
observed less often than simple mispricings (even though I assume a commission
0
0.05
0.10
0.15
Mispricing
Arbitrage Returns
(a)
(b)
M
isp
ric
in
g
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000
T
–0.20
–0.15
–0.10
–0.05
0
0.05
R
et
ur
ns
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000
T
Arbitrage_strategy Zero
Fig. 3. (a) The Mispricing of Bets on Andy Murray to Win the 2012 Wimbledon Men’s Singles
Championship Final, Plotted Against Time. Mispricing is Defined as the Absolute Difference Between the
Implied Win Probabilities in the Win and Set Markets. (b) The Returns to a Risk-free Arbitrage Strategy – as
Described in Brown (2013) – Which Takes a Short Position in the Win Market and a Long Position in the
Set Market
Notes. A commission level of 2% (the lowest possible) is assumed for this strategy. Data are
displayed until Murray lost a set.
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rate as low as 2%).6 Until mispricing breaches a certain level, traders cannot
arbitrage this discrepancy remotely. This may explain why liquidity providers leave
set quotes that will soon be out of date, knowing that they are unlikely to be picked
off. It may also explain why we must often wait for lulls in play – and, in some cases,
for the end of the match and the resolution of all uncertainty – for mispricing to
totally disappear.
5. Conclusion
Limited attention has become a feature of models of investor learning behaviour
(Peng and Xiong, 2006) and portfolio allocation (Huang and Liu, 2007; Mondria,
2010). Some of the more prominent empirical puzzles and anomalies in financial
markets – such as stock price momentum and the underdiversification of investor
portfolios – can be generated in these models. Moreover, these propositions rely on an
extremely uncontroversial assumption: traders do not have unlimited capacity to
receive and process information.
In this article, I examine the evidence that information processing constraints lead
to asset mispricing. In the process of my examination, I exploit the unique conditions
present on a UK sports betting exchange. Assets – contingent on the outcome of a
tennis match – are traded in two markets (the win and the set market) both pre-inplay
(when no information arrives) and inplay (when information is turned on like a tap). I
argue that the arrival of information means that traders’ information processing
constraints suddenly become binding.
I then present three pieces of evidence consistent with the notion that information
processing constraints are a cause of mispricing. The level of mispricing between the
two assets is 10 times greater during the arrival of information compared to zero-
information periods. This is the time when information processing constraints are
more likely to be binding; part of this mispricing can be attributed to differences in the
frequency with which traders update the values of the two assets during each match;
price discovery is led by the market with the most frequent updating of prices (during
the treatment). This suggests that traders’ limited information processing capacity was
predominantly put to work in the pricing of just one asset. Put together, these three
results suggest a role for traders’ information processing constraints in the formation
of mispricing in asset markets.
The environment that I study is relatively simple. All of the assets are short lived and
have binary payoffs. Although information arrives at high-frequency, it is arguably quite
simple to factor the binary outcome of each point into an updated asset price.
Furthermore, mispricing is tethered by the presence of a replicating portfolio – which
allows for risk-free arbitrage between markets – and the imminent end of each match
when all uncertainty is resolved.
Contrast this environment with that found in the stock market, for example, where
the distribution of payoffs is (almost) continuous, information arrives in complex
6 Incidentally, if you consider the existence of arbitrage opportunities to be a purer measure of mispricing
than the measure used in this article, arbitrage opportunities are also statistically more likely to arise inplay –
than pre-inplay – across the full 14 matches.
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quantitative and qualitative forms, the pricing of assets requires the discounting of cash
flows that arrive far into the future, and where the level of mispricing is often
untethered (Stein, 2009). If I find evidence to suggest that information processing
constraints cause mispricing in this simple betting market, the potential for such an
effect in more complicated financial markets, is vast.
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